which covertly provided separate amenities for blacks despite the antidiscrimination policies of the U.S. Department of the Interior.

Racial and religious discrimination also pervaded rural resorts. Lake resorts had been a vacation staple since the late nineteenth century when urban residents began to take the train to escape the city’s summer heat. After World War II, family-owned resorts, many with a working-class clientele, prospered as city dwellers sought out opportunities to fish and relax as a family. African Americans, notes Rugh, were routinely excluded from these resorts and, in response, created separate resorts where middle-class blacks could enjoy country life. Similarly, Jews excluded from resorts created their own rural enclaves, most importantly in the Catskills. Rugh recreates this Borscht Belt world but places it within the context of a nation obsessed by the family vacation, rather than as a distinctive aspect of Jewish life. Indeed, the decline of the Catskills vacation spots parallels the decline of similar white and black resort areas, part of a larger turning away from insular family vacationing. As baby boomers grew up, many rejected their parents’ insular, family-oriented values and chose to vacation separately as adults, not as parents attempting to educate and amuse their offspring. Family vacationing became a niche market, not a mass phenomenon.

But was the vacation world Rugh describes a golden age, even for white middle-class families? What is missing from Rugh’s narrative are the more negative aspects of vacationing suggested by the book’s title. While she does an admirable job outlining the racial and religious exclusions of vacation travel, she largely avoids criticizing white middle-class vacationing. I wondered, for example, whether the housewife setting up an elaborate camp in a rural campsite saw this experience as an escape from housework or whether children felt trapped in their station wagons on their way to yet another historic site. The omission in Rugh’s analysis, I suspect, emerges from her sources. In her discussions of discrimination, Rugh mines manuscript material to great effect, but her descriptive chapters on family vacationing rely on promotional literature. That literature reinforces our sense of a golden age but does little to complicate it. Nevertheless, Rugh’s book provides an insightful overview of an understudied period in the history of American vacationing.

—Victoria W. Wolcott, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY

**The Leisure Economy: How Changing Demographics, Economics, and Generational Attitudes Will Reshape Our Lives and Our Industries**

Linda Nazareth

In the 1980s and 1990s, I taught a class of 200 to 250 students an Introduction to Leisure Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign and often showed a film titled *Leisure: Living with the 20-Hour Week*. Produced in 1970, it heralded a new age of leisure with people working only twenty hours per week or maybe six months per year and having access to new
kinds of resorts all over the world. Freedom and escape would be everywhere. The new era was scheduled to begin in the 1980s, and the profound changes that would usher it in were in the area of technology, specifically the mechanization and automation of work. The film had been created even before the introduction of useful personal computers such as the Apple II in 1977 and the IBM PC in 1981, but its various narrators boldly predicted the end of work as we know it. Machines, the film forecast, would be doing it all for us. Not only did the predictions fail to materialize, but by the mid-1980s, the film was simply silly. The predictions—as well as the clothes and hairstyles of those in the film—evoked peals of laughter in my classes. My point in showing the film was to illustrate the peril in making predictions. As someone once said, more or less (the quote has been attributed to a host of wits from Yogi Berra to Albert Einstein), “It’s difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.”

Despite such difficulty, predictions about a coming, often golden, age of leisure have been common. In the 1920s, members of the Technical Alliance, one of America’s first think tanks, headquartered at Columbia University with members such as Howard Scott, Stuart Chase, Leland Olds, and Thorstein Veblen, predicted four, four-hour workdays per week. The goal of the Technical Alliance was to survey the natural resources of North America and determine how they could be translated into an optimal standard of living for all and how a new form of government, a technate, could be achieved. In the Black Bill of 1933, the U.S. Congress aimed to limit working hours to thirty per week. According to Benjamin Kline Humnicut’s 1988 Work Without End: Abandoning Short Hours for the Right to Work, President Franklin D. Roosevelt regarded the bill as a prelude to socialism and had it tied up in a House committee until it emerged five years later as the Fair Labor Standards Act, gutted of the thirty-hour workweek. Other philosophies included Roger Payne’s 1939 Why Work? Or, the Coming Age of Leisure and Plenty. Payne claimed to be a “hobo philosopher” and wrote that we can live happily working only one day per week rather than five. He wrote that America’s industrial might, properly adjusted, could provide for all with minimum labor.

None of these predictions came to pass, but in one case documented by Hunnicut’s 1996 Kellogg’s Six-Hour Day, breakfast-food magnate W. K. Kellogg switched from the traditional three, eight-hour shifts in his cereal plant to four, six-hour shifts, giving his workers a thirty-six hour workweek. By doing so, he both created jobs in depression-strapped Battle Creek, Michigan, but also shifted the balance of time from work to leisure. Kellogg management ended the experiment in 1985, arguing that work, rather than leisure, provides individuals with identity, meaning, and purpose. Moreover, although some women continued to hold out for shorter hours, workers accepted the idea. For an extended survey of less work and more leisure, as well as efforts to create both, see A. O. Veal’s The Elusive Leisure Society (2009).

In the The Leisure Economy, economist Linda Nazareth takes a new and different tack. Instead of predating the coming leisure age on the automation of labor, which pretty clearly has not worked, she looks, instead, at demographics. She makes a
couple of claims, the first of which is clear and obvious: the baby-boom generation (born between 1946 and 1964) has begun to retire and will continue to do so in ever-increasing numbers. More retired people means more leisure, plain and simple. And the economy will have to do something to provide this ever-growing number of retirees with leisure pursuits to fill their time. Nazareth spends considerable space commenting on the “time crunch” economy of today. She cites, for example, Juliet Schor’s *The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure* (1992), which claims that we are actually working longer hours than in the 1960s. She also cites research showing the opposite, although not John P. Robinson and Geoffrey Godbey’s *Time for Life: The Surprising Ways Americans Use Their Time* (1999). Robinson and Godbey show—using time diary data rather than recall data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as Schor does—that Americans’ free time has been increasing, not decreasing, over the past thirty years. Nazareth sidesteps this debate and, instead, asserts that we perceive ourselves to be time crunched whether or not we really have more or less free time than in the past.

Nazareth also examines the attitudes and values of baby boomers as well as those of members of Generation X (born between 1965 and 1976) and Generation Y (born between 1977 and 1999), regarding Gen X as rather unlucky and Gen Y as technology savvy but spoiled and lazy. She claims that the second group, in particular, has new and different attitudes toward life, work, and leisure, one that contrasts especially with the boomer view that life is defined by work. The boomer value comes, in large part, from demographics: if you are part of a large cohort, the competition for resources, such as jobs, is more intense. Therefore, this competition becomes part of one’s world view. We compete for work, not leisure, so work is paramount. So, larger generations experience less leisure than smaller ones.

Nazareth refers to generations X and Y as “the slacker generations.” She claims that members of Generation Y, in particular, value their leisure to the point that it affects their job choices and the nature of job design itself (e.g., working from home rather than commuting to an office). Generation Y also values at least the prospects of home and family. They would rather have a life than have work be their lives.

Finally, Nazareth indicates that all is not fair. As we know, some baby boomers have already retired and are doing well. Others have delayed retirement for personal reasons. Some in Generation X are doing just fine, others not as well; and the same is true of Generation Y. Nazareth completes her book by telling us how both society and individuals can make the best of the coming leisure economy. She provides citations to numerous surveys and studies by futurists to back up her claims and conclusions, so the book might be good reading for both academics and for those who are interested in their own or others’ impending retirements. But, something (bad) happened.

Nazareth’s book was published in 2007, just as the housing bubble began to boil over and the worst economic turn since the Great Depression was about to throw a wrench into the plans of lots of people. While the demographics Nazareth discusses have not changed, the economics have. And she, like nearly all other economists, did not see it coming. So,
her predictions about the flood of boomer retirements on the horizon are now on hold, or so it seems. Naturally, older people hanging on to their jobs means that younger people are not going to get them or, at least, not right now. But, it may be that only the timing of Nazareth’s predictions is thrown off. After all, the boomers have to retire—or die—sometime. But maybe the values of members of Generation X and Generation Y will be affected. After all, 2009 high school and college graduates face a bleak job market, one in which they experience the hypercompetition that Nazareth claims shaped the values of the boomers.

Nazareth’s argument has merit, nevertheless, and those interested in the future of work and leisure should take a look at the book. Many will find it written in what might be called a breezy and engaging style. Frankly, I found it annoying and difficult to read. She uses anecdotes from apparent interviews to support numerous claims, but these wear thin pretty quickly. Sample sizes of one are never very impressive. Moreover, while she is careful to point out that not everyone has profited, or will profit, equally from economic cycles and generational changes, she has a tendency to homogenize people (e.g., baby boomer, Generation X, Generation Y). People in these alleged groups are not the same and do not all have the same attitudes and values. The sweep of her generalizations is often breathtaking.

Nevertheless, there is one thing that we can learn by reading the book. Making predictions is still hard, especially about the future.

—Garry Chick, The Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA

**Forming Ethical Identities in Early Childhood Play**

**Brian Edmiston**


Part of Routledge’s Contesting Early Childhood series, Brian Edmiston’s *Forming Ethical Identities in Early Childhood Play* adds to the growing literature on the experience of classroom play. In particular, he explores some of the meanings of ethical relationships that are inherent in the social context of early-childhood classrooms. Unlike John Dewey, with his pragmatic notion about play and classroom community, Edmiston works from a dialogic perspective; play activities are where ethical identities are “authored” by the participants. Rather than seeing play primarily as a developmental phenomenon like Jean Piaget or Lev S. Vygotsky, Edmiston elaborates on the moral meanings that contribute to who players are as they create classroom play. This approach to understanding play adds a whole new layer to the sets of meanings that we can consider when we practice and study classroom play.

To support his argument, Edmiston takes us on a well-documented journey through classroom-play experiences. He begins with some familiar notions about imaginary play and then adds depth to them by seeing how pretend can be “everyday” or “mythic.” It is in mythic play that children (and their teachers) begin to explore some of the deeper meanings that resonate in high art and literature and in popular culture. Pretend is not merely enactment of what is imagined;